6 nature. 29 In such political disputes, the Court held, "outrageousness" was insufficient for liability, 30 because sufficient breathing space is required to encourage robust political debate. 31 Therefore, in order to provide that breathing space, the Court held that public figures and public officials could not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress without proving actual malice -that the material was published with knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.
32
The application of the actual malice test to the parody in Hustler is problematic because a test of truth or falsity is being applied to rhetorical hyperbole that was not intended to assert actual facts. Indeed, a literal application of the actual malice test would clearly demonstrate that Hustler magazine had published the parody with knowledge of falsity. 33 At the bottom of the page on which the parody appeared, Hustler printed the disclaimer, "ad parody -not to be taken seriously." And the magazine's private persons involved in matters of public concern must also prove actual malice in libel cases that grow from those issues.
48
It was the nature -or content -of the speech, therefore, that should control the plaintiff's burden of proof rather than the status of the plaintiff. Justice Brennan continued that approach in his dissent to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 49 in which the Court overruled the Rosenbloom plurality. The Gertz Court reaffirmed that public debate is important and, therefore, some falsehood must be 43 376 U.S. 254 (1964) . 44 Id. at 279-80. 45 388 U.S. 130 (1967) . 46 403 U.S. 29 (1971) . 47 The actual malice rule also was expanded in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) , in which the Court held that the rule applied to public officials involved in cases of criminal libel. 48 403 U.S. at 43-44. 49 418 U.S. 323 (1974) . Justice Brennan adhered to his Rosenbloom opinion, maintaining that the best protection for robust debate required that actual malice be applied when private persons were involved "in matters of public or general interest." Id. at 61 (Brennan, J., dissenting In Hustler the Court emphasized the importance of protecting speech on matters of public concern, but it's clear that a primary reason the parody constituted speech of public concern was Falwell's status as a public figure who was an active participant in a public debate. 64 The confluence of a public figure embroiled in a public debate -not simply the existence of a matter of public concern-required the heightened standard.
No one -other than members of Westboro Baptist Church 65 -alleged that the Snyders were public figures or that they were involved in a public debate. By abandoning its approach of looking at the public-private distinction 66 and establishing what one authority called a very broad "inquiring-minds-want-to-know" kind of standard, 67 the Supreme Court ignored a large body of precedent and effected a significant shift from a personbased standard to a subject-matter-based standard. made public. 87 The jury found in favor of Snyder on the remaining three claimsintrusion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and conspiracy -and awarded him $2.9 million in compensatory and $8 million punitive damages. 88 On a post-verdict motion by the church, the district court reduced punitive damages to $2.1 million.
89
The defendants also had asked the district court to overrule the verdict, but the court found the evidence sufficient to support the jury's verdict on each of the three claims.
90
The district court rejected the claim of Phelps and his church that the funeral was a public event and that Matthew and Albert Snyder became public figures because the father placed an obituary notice in newspapers. 91 Albert Snyder did not invite attention, the court held, and the increased interest in the funeral was primarily the doing of Phelps and his followers. They had contacted law enforcement officials, the court noted, because of past problems caused by their protests and, indeed, their presence resulted in increased police presence and media coverage. "Defendants cannot by their own actions transform a private funeral into a public event and then bootstrap their position by arguing that Matthew Snyder was a public figure," the court held.
92
The court also found that Albert Snyder's testimony provided the jury with "sufficient evidence. . . to conclude that [he] had suffered 'severe and specific' injuries,"
Baptist Church in picketing the funeral of a serviceman killed in Iraq were obnoxious, the First Amendment rights of the church should be protected. 108 That protection is necessary, these advocates wrote, in order to protect discourse on matters of public concern 109 and to avoid liability based on the fact that a target of obnoxious speech was merely offended.
110
Indeed, some news organizations even contended that a finding against the church would harm free press rights, 111 though purportedly few of the members of those organizations orchestrated targeted attacks designed to harm individuals.
112
While free speech is important, and while even obnoxious speech must be protected in order to preserve the freedom for "speech that matters," 113 much that has been written about the Snyder case is simply wrong. The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress have been misstated, the potential damage to freedom of expression on matters of public concern has been greatly exaggerated, and, inexplicably, Chief Justice Roberts found that the case "turns largely on whether. . . speech is of public or private concern, as determined by all the circumstances of the case." The Free 114 See Brief of the Reporters Committee, supra note 108, at 2. The fear that a finding for Snyder might harm newsgathering is apparently based on the concern that news organizations covering groups like the Westboro Baptist Church might become the targets of lawsuits by offended viewers. There is little support for the concern. Though Albert Snyder was alerted to the church's activities by news reports, no media organization or reporter was ever a party to the suit, and could not be a party to an intentional infliction suit under such circumstances. Intentional infliction suits are designed to seek redress because of a targeted attack, rather than the dissemination of information. See infra notes 154-64 and accompanying discussion.
Speech Clause of the First Amendment, he wrote, "can serve as a defense in state tort suits, including suits for intentional infliction of emotional distress."
118
The boundaries of the public concern test are not well defined, Chief Justice Roberts wrote, but the Court has established some guiding principles. 119 Matters of public concern, the chief justice wrote, are any matters "'of political, social or other concern to the community,'" 120 including any subject "'of legitimate news interest.'" 121 In addition, the inappropriate or controversial nature of the speech is irrelevant to the question of whether it deals with a matter of public concern. The Court held that the content of the protest "plainly relates to broad issues of interest to society at large," that is, "the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals involving the Catholic Clergy."
125
The context of the speech also contributed to its public nature. The Court found it of no significant import that church members spoke "in connection with a funeral," it was important that the protest took place on public land. 126 Chief Justice Roberts noted that Albert Snyder had proved he had suffered severe emotional distress, 127 but found that public streets occupy "a special position" in terms of First Amendment protection, and a peaceful picket about matters of public concern in such a place is protected. 128 Justice Alito wrote that it is "abundantly clear" that church members went "far beyond commentary on matters of public concern" and "specifically attacked" the Snyders. Both Matthew and Albert Snyder were private figures, he wrote, and the speech was not on a matter of public concern, and could not be insulated by the fact that it occurred on public property.
143
Justice Alito also criticized the majority for its failure to consider the video as part of the case:
The protest and epic are parts of a single course of conduct that the jury found to constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court's strange insistence the epic "is not properly before us". . . means that the Court has not actually made "an independent examination of the whole record". . . . And the Court's refusal to consider the epic contrasts sharply with its willingness to take notice of Westboro's protest activities at other times and locations. The district court judge also reported that Snyder was often reduced to tears during the trial, was "visibly shaken and distressed," and was granted the opportunity several times to leave the courtroom to compose himself. "The jury," the judge wrote, "witnessed firsthand Plaintiff's anguish and the unresolved grief he harbors because of the failure to conduct a normal burial."
174
In addition, expert witnesses testified that Snyder's diabetes had worsened and his depression deepened as a result of the actions by church members, "thereby preventing him from going through the normal grieving process."
175
The burden of proof for intentional infliction of emotional distress is narrow and onerous, but Albert Snyder clearly met that burden. The Supreme Court, however, had applied a subject-matter test in such cases, rather than a public/private person test, raising the bar for any private people who become subject to verbal attacks. Private people on the other hand, are private: They remain out of the view of the public and are not embroiled in debate on matters of public concern. The Court has also recognized a difference between public and private persons, especially in tort actions, and established a reasonable balance between protections for robust debate and for the rights of private persons to remain private. 191 Arguably private persons sometimes are involuntarily embroiled in matters of public concern, and when that happens, possibly, they should face the same burdens as public persons. 192 When they are targets, however, even though they are only bystanders, it is both unfair and legally illogical to saddle them with the same burdens as public persons, even when the issues used to attack them involve matters of public concern. Whatever logic one may argue for the existence of The outcome of a case is controlled by the fact that an attacker may target a private person not involved in matters of public concern so long as the attack is cloaked in the garb matters of pubic concern and takes place in a public sphere.
ANALYSIS

Even though the Court did not specifically address private persons in Hustler,
Borden points out, 198 that does not mean they are not implicated by the decision. To the contrary, she notes, "[I]f the Court's logic were to be consistent, a private person would be required to meet a lower standard of fault than would a public person." 199 The extension of that logic, another authority writes, would mean private persons would have to prove actual malice in order to recover punitive damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
200
Indeed, some courts have applied just that logic, holding that private persons bringing suits for intentional infliction of emotional distress face a more stringent burden of proof in some circumstances. whole record," 207 found that portions of the record focusing on the video could be ignored because the video was not mentioned in the petition for certiorari.
Justice Alito criticized the majority for that failing. 208 In addition, he wrote, the video was part of the evidence that the jury considered, and the protest and video were "parts of a single course of conduct that the jury found to constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress." 209 Even without the video, however, Jeffery Shulman writes that there was a personal nature to the protest, one Chief Justice Roberts avoided by holding that those personal attacks were of a public nature. 212 In so doing, the chief justice watered down the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 213 Under the Court's tort law jurisprudence, Shulman wrote, for the church to be protected, there must be something about Snyder's conduct that would allow speech to be directed at him, but there was no demonstrable connection between the Snyders and the church. 214 Courts resolving cases involving involuntary public figures in other tort actions have agreed. 215 Chief Justice
Roberts found the speech protected, despite the personal attack, because of its "overall thrust and dominant theme." 216 He did not explain why the "overall thrust" outweighed the series of individual attacks on the Snyders, but one might expect that the reason was that such a focus helped define the speech as being on matters of public concern rather than a targeted attack.
217
A focus on the issues presented -tort law in general and intentional infliction of emotional distress in particular -would have required the Court to either follow its precedent or explain why it was overruling, distinguishing or modifying that precedent.
Prior to Snyder, there was a balance between speech on matters of public concern and speech aimed at private persons. emotional distress and ignored the public/private distinction, finding that a holding that offending speech involves matters of public concerns trumps all other factors, which is unfortunate. Intentional infliction of emotional distress could provide private people with protection against unwarranted attack from persons who were not attempting to engage in a public debate but simply to gain attention. One has trouble imagining why a group would attack an innocent bystander for any but self-serving motives, and such attacks do not deserve First Amendment protection.
The Snyder Court easily could have used Hustler as the foundation for a rule that did not eliminate the balance between the rights of speakers and the private persons they attack. Rather than providing absolute protection when offending speech appears to involve matters of public concern, the Court could have established that First Amendment protection applies when the speech both involves matters of public concern and is targeted at public officials or public figures -or at private persons engaged in the debate. The rule has its foundation in Hustler and Gertz and is applicable to Snyder. The rule would not impact protesters who speak on matters of public concern without brutalizing private persons who are not involved in the debate.
Albert Snyder was not embroiled in debate over a matter of public concern when attacked by the Westboro Baptist Church -he was a mourning father doing no more than attempting to bury his son in peace. That right was denied him because of the designed efforts of church members to intentionally inflict upon him severe emotional distress.
The boundaries of intentional infliction cases are narrowly drawn and, as such, provide protection for private people without burdening the guarantees of free speech and a free press. The balance provided by the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is lost, thanks to Snyder v. Phelps. That balance did not significantly inhibit free speech, but its loss serves to inhibit the rights of private people to be free from brutal, unwarranted attacks.
